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Abstract: This essay investigates digital media devices and networks for 
addressing the spread and control of the novel coronavirus/COVID-19 
infection. But unlike many of the other essays in this special issue, it will 
not focus on the message — the information and misinformation, the 
accurate reportageand the rumors, or the news and the fake-news— that 
is conveyed onthese digital platforms. Instead, I will focus on the use 
of digital mobile devices and networks to monitor and control the social 
aspectsof the virus and the vectors of infection. Toward this end, we will 
considerthe different ways that mobile technology can be employed to 
address and respond to a global pandemic like COVID-19; and we will 
examine the opportunities and challenges of DCTT in an effort not just to 
understand how these technologies work but to extract from this analysis 
a clear formulation of their possible benefits and attendant costs.
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Rastreamento digital de contatos: o meio é a mensagem
Resumo: Este ensaio investiga dispositivos e redes de mídia digital 
para abordar a disseminação e o controle da nova infecção por 
coronavírus / COVID-19. Mas, ao contrário de muitos dos outros 
ensaios nesta edição especial, ele não se concentrará na mensagem - a 
informação e a desinformação, a reportagem precisa e os rumores, ou 
as notícias e as notícias falsas - que é transmitida nessas plataformas 
digitais. Em vez disso, vou me concentrar no uso de dispositivos e 
redes móveis digitais para monitorar e controlar os aspectos sociais 
do vírus e os vetores de infecção. Para esse fim, consideraremos as 
diferentes maneiras como a tecnologia móvel pode ser empregada 
para abordar e responder a uma pandemia global como o COVID-19; 
e examinaremos as oportunidades e desafios do DCTT em um esforço 
não apenas para entender como essas tecnologias funcionam, mas 
para extrair dessa análise uma formulação clara de seus possíveis 
benefícios e custos associados.
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Rastreo digital de contactos: el medio es el mensaje
Resumen: Este ensayo investiga dispositivos y redes de medios digitales 
para abordar la propagación y el control de la nueva infección por 
coronavirus / COVID-19. Pero, a diferencia de muchos de los otros ensayos 
de esta edición especial, no se centrará en el mensaje - la información 
y la desinformación, los informes precisos y los rumores, o las noticias 
y noticias falsas - que se transmiten en estas plataformas digitales. En 
cambio, me centraré en el uso de redes y dispositivos móviles digitales 
para monitorear y controlar los aspectos sociales del virus y los vectores de 
infección. Para eso, consideraremos las diferentes formas en que se puede 
emplear la tecnología móvil para abordar y responder a una pandemia 
global como del COVID-19; y examinaremos las oportunidades y desafíos 
de DCTT en un esfuerzo no solo por comprender cómo funcionan estas 
tecnologías, sino por extraer de este análisis una formulación clara de sus 
posibles beneficios y costos asociados.
Palabras clave: Coronavirus; tecnología móvil; Principio moral.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices and the data networks that support them provide 
unprecedented opportunities for the distribution of information—both 
accurate reports and rumor—during the time of pandemic (Merchant 
and Lurie 2020, Ali and Kurasawa 2020). Responding to this challenge 
has required careful attention to the content that is distributed by 
digital platforms and the effect these messages have had on individual 
users and communities. This is standard operating procedure in media 
and communication studies. The focus of analysis is predominantly 
on the content of the message, its geographical reach, and its social 
impact and effects. But this is only one part of the total picture. As 
Canadian media theorist Marshall McLuhan (1995) had argued over 
five decades ago, an exclusive focus on the content of the media can 
have the effect of distracting us from perceiving how the exigencies of 
the medium may itself be the message. 
This essay investigates digital media devices and networks for 
addressing the spread and control of the novel coronavirus/COVID-19 
infection. But unlike many of the other essays in this special issue, it 
will not focus on the message—the information and misinformation, 
the accurate reportage and the rumors, or the news and the fake-
news—that is conveyed on these digital platforms. Instead, I will 
focus on the use of digital mobile devices and networks to monitor 
and control the social aspects of the virus and the vectors of infection. 
The essays will therefore pivot from an almost exclusive concern with 
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the messages that have been developed for and disseminated by digital 
media and focus attention on the medium of digital technology and its 
cost/benefits for controlling the COVID-19 pandemic. 
Toward this end, the investigation will proceed in three steps. 
First, we will consider the different ways that mobile technology 
can be employed to address and respond to a global pandemic like 
COVID-19. Since will we not have the time or space to consider all 
the available strategies and methods, this overview is provided in order 
to get a big picture perspective from which we can then drill down 
into one particular application that has attracted a good amount of 
attention, digital contact tracing technology (DCTT). Second, we will 
examine the opportunities and challenges of DCTT in an effort not just 
to understand how these technologies work but to extract from this 
analysis a clear formulation of their possible benefits and attendant 
costs. Finally, we will conclude with consideration of the most notable 
issues for using DCTT to address the COVID-19 crisis. Like all 
technological solutions, DCTT has promise. But those promises are 
not without complications and potential hazards.    
2 COVID-19 Pandemic and Mobile Tech
Mobile devices, service providers, and the existing cellular 
network—an ensemble of different technologies that can be lumped 
together under the umbrella term “mobile technology”—are not just 
convenient tools for communication and information dissemination, 
they are a system of mobile sensors that can be employed by users, 
governments, and public health officials to help track and hopefully 
control the spread of infection. During the COVID-19 crisis, mobile 
technology has already been used in three distinct ways: documentation, 
modeling, and contact tracing.
1) Documentation – Documentation efforts involve using 
mobile technology to track where people are situated for the purposes 
of managing self-isolation and quarantine. This is accomplished by 
collecting data on user location. During previous global pandemics, like 
the 1918 Spanish flu, this was mainly achieved by manual processes 
aided by the technology of telephone and mail. We can now do the 
same by using the technology of mobile smartphones and cellular 
data services. In Taiwan, for instance, the government has developed 
an App to track and help ensure that quarantined individuals remain 
within the boundaries of their quarantine. If a user strays outside the 
predefined borders, the App can alert the user and/or public health 
officials. These Apps work by using geolocation data, either by way of 
triangulation from cellphone towers or GPS signals. Although useful 
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for managing quarantine, these documentation solutions do have 
significant privacy concerns. As reported by Access Now (2020, 11), 
the Taiwanese App “assumes that there is a documented link between 
each individual’s identity, their phone number, and their residential 
address, which includes information on co-habitants.”
2) Modeling – Modeling provides for a less invasive form of 
management. By using anonymized data provided by service providers, 
it is possible to track population densities and identify potential “hot 
spots” for the spread of disease. Internet companies and platforms (i.e. 
Bytedance, Facebook, Google, Tencent, AT&T, etc.) already gather 
data about what their billions of users are doing and where. This data, 
which is typically utilized for providing users with location-specific 
data concerning weather, road congestion, or other conveniences, can 
also be used to track alterations in user location and demographic 
density in specific geophysical locations. Like documentation efforts, 
modeling employs geo-location data, which is something service 
providers already collect and process, and this information can be 
easily obtained either from triangulation between cellphone towers or 
GPS. But unlike documentation, modeling typically does not require 
a dedicated App (since it is using a feature that is already part of 
the standard operating procedures of the data network) and do not 
typically employ user-identifying information. 
For this reason, modeling has better privacy protections for 
users and is therefore less invasive. But what modeling gains in 
privacy protections, it sacrifice to accuracy. Modeling solutions can 
help public health officials track changes in location and population 
density over time and this information may aid public health officials 
in mapping potential hot spots for the spread of infection. But that is 
all. Modeling, therefore, can produce impressive-looking “heat maps” 
to help visualize how well quarantine is working (or not), but this 
information is often considered to be too coarse or general for the 
actual management of the spread of infection.
3) Digital Contact Tracing – Digital contract tracing technology 
endeavors to split the difference. It seeks to provide the kind of direct 
and positive control over the spread of the virus that comes from 
documentation efforts along with the privacy preserving features 
that are available with modeling. Contact tracing is not new. Public 
health officials have, during the time of previous viral outbreaks, like 
AIDS and SARS, used contract tracing to control the spread of the 
disease. This was typically accomplished by manual data collection 
and processing procedures. When someone showed signs of being ill, 
they were interviewed to figure out where they had been and with 
whom they had contact. Then the individuals exposed to risk of 
infection (“contacts”) could be notified by public health officials and 
provided instructions on how to protect themselves and others. This 
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work is time and labor intensive, requiring an army of human contact 
tracers typically utilizing either in person interviews, telephone, or 
text messaging.  Similar efforts are already in place and have been 
deployed in response to the COVID-19 crisis. 
There are, however, legitimate concerns that manual contact 
tracing may be too slow and inefficient to respond to the unprecedented 
scope and rapid proliferation of this particular viral outbreak. Digital 
contact tracing technology (DCTT) has been introduced and promoted 
as a solution to this problem (Ferretti et al. 2020). In Singapore, Israel 
and India there is already an App for that. In Europe there is debate 
between two competing frameworks, which have names that sound 
like Star Wars’ droids: PEPP-PT and DT-3T (Pan-European Privacy-
Preserving Proximity Tracing and Decentralized Privacy-Preserving 
Proximity Tracing). And in the US, Apple and Google recently 
announced collaboration on an exposure notification API (application 
program interface) that was publically released in mid-May 2020.2 
3 Digital Contact Tracing Technologies   
DCTT is not one technology but identifies a spectrum of different 
technological solutions and implementation strategies. On one end of 
the spectrum there are what can be called the “maximal approach.” 
These efforts employ centralized collection and processing of data 
and therefore require implementation and management by a trusted 
third party, which is, more often than not, a national government. 
Maximal DCTT solutions have already been deployed in South Korea 
and have helped contribute to that country’s rapid and successful 
response to the COVID-19 crisis. As reported by Access Now, “the 
information published online includes a wealth of information, such 
as details about when people left for work, whether they wore masks 
in the subway, the name of the stations where they changed trains, 
the massage parlors and karaoke bars they frequented, and the names 
of the clinics where they were tested.” But having this information 
centralized and then published online has had significant privacy 
costs and the data has been (mis)used to identify and harass infected 
individuals (Kim 2020).
On the other end of the spectrum are the privacy preserving 
efforts like the two frameworks being debated in the EU and the Apple/
Google partnership (Google 2020). In these decentralized approaches, 
data is stored and processed locally on the user’s device and individual 
identity is preserved. These minimal DCTT solutions use Bluetooth 
“handshakes” to identify and record contact between users and then 
store and process this proximity data without registering the identity 
2  On 10 April 2020, Apple and 
Google announce an unprecedented 
collaboration with two phases: “First, 
in May, both companies will release 
APIs that enable interoperability 
between Android and iOS devices 
using apps from public health 
authorities. These official apps will 
be available for users to download 
via their respective app stores. 
Second, in the coming months, Apple 
and Google will work to enable a 
broader Bluetooth-based contact 
tracing platform by building this 
functionality into the underlying 
platforms” (Apple 2020). As 
anticipated, phase one was completed 
on 20 May 2020 with beta release 
of an exposure notification API. The 
second phase of the effort, however, 
may be under revision insofar as the 
two tech giants have indicated they 
will continue conversations with 
public health authorities concerning 
the exigencies of an OS-based contact 
and/or exposure notification system.
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of the individual contact. As explained by a published report from 
the Johns Hopkins University Project on Ethics and Governance of 
Digital Contact Tracing Technologies:  
In most architectures, these proximity data are stored in the 
users’ phones as anonymized “beacons” that cannot be used to re-
identify the users directly. If a user with a PPPT [privacy-preserving 
proximity tracking] app installed on their phone tests positive and 
enters test results into their app, those who have been in contact with 
them can be notified by the app. This “exposure notification” can be 
automatic or at the discretion of the COV+ person [i.e. an individual 
who has tested positive for COVID-19 infection], depending on the 
app design. If notified, a user who has been in contact with a COV+ 
individual would receive a push notification alerting them to possible 
exposure (which may be timestamped), but with no other identifying 
information (Kahn et al. 2020, 4).
The advantages of this approach to contact tracing is that it does 
not require centralization of personal data or a trusted third party. It 
is therefore insulated from (although maybe not entirely immune to) 
many of the privacy concerns that accrue to the maximal approaches. 
The one disadvantage to the minimal approach is that it is less effective 
from a public health perspective, since individual infected persons are 
not able to be identified, tracked, and directly contacted.  
In between these two extremes are a range of middle-ground 
solutions that try to strike a balance by capitalizing on the best both sides 
have to offer. These middle-ground solutions involve “the collection 
and storage of personal data—including identifying information and 
location data—on the user’s phone. These decentralized but personally 
identifiable data can then be voluntarily shared with public health 
officials if the user tests positive for SARS-CoV-2” (Kahn et al. 2020, 
4). Iceland’s Rakning C-19, which launched in early April, is a good 
example of a middle ground solution. It keeps tracks users’ GPS data 
to compile a record of where they have been, allowing investigators—
with permission—to look at whether those with a positive diagnosis 
are potentially spreading the disease. Another middle-ground solution 
has been proposed by a team at MIT under the moniker Safe Paths. 
As described on the project’s website, this solution consists of two 
components: a user-facing smartphone application called “PrivateKit” 
and a web application for public health officials called “Safe Places.” 
The PrivateKit app will enable users to match the personal diary 
of location data on their smartphones with anonymized, redacted, and 
blurred location history of infected patients. The digital contact tracing 
uses overlapped GPS and Bluetooth trails that allow an individual 
to check if they have crossed paths with someone who was later 
diagnosed positive for the virus. Through Safe Places, public health 
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officials are equipped to redact location trails of diagnosed carriers 
and thus broadcast location information with privacy protection for 
both diagnosed patients and for local businesses (Raskar, Pentland 
and Esvelt 2020).
4 Challenges and Potential Problems
DCTT has promise. It provides individuals, communities, and 
public health officials with a set of tools that may be effective for 
responding to the COVID-19 pandemic. Despite these opportunities, 
however, there are a number of significant challenges. 
1) Adoption Rates – Many, if not most of the minimal DCTT 
solutions are opt-in and voluntary, meaning that users will need to 
actively download, install, and utilize the contract tracing App. And 
the effectiveness of any DCTT solution is directly dependent on the 
number of opt-ins. An Oxford University study indicates that there 
needs to be at least a 56% adoption rate to be effective in stopping the 
spread of the virus (Hinch et al 2020, 3). No one has come close to this 
figure. Singapore’s TraceTogether App achieved only 20% adoption, 
and, for this reason, has not really been sufficient to make a significant 
impact. Iceland’s Rakning C-19 has achieved 38%, which is, to date, 
the highest adoption rate worldwide. At this rate of adoption, the 
Rakning C-19 has been credited as being a useful piece of the contract 
tracing puzzle, but it is not in and of itself a game changer. Although 
the US has yet to implement DCTT on a national scale, studies of 
potential user acceptance indicate similar problems. In a national 
study of 2,000 US citizens, conducted between 30 April and 1 May 
2020, just over 30 percent of users indicated they would download 
and use a mobile contact-tracing app. 
The best designed technological solutions could fail miserably, 
if the technology is not widely adopted, trusted by users, and actually 
employed. For this reason, there is need for a) clear and transparent 
communication from trusted authorities so that users know what 
DCTT is and how and why it is being used and b) on-going “boots 
on the ground” intelligence efforts concerning the efficacy of these 
technological solutions and how they come to be implemented, 
adopted, and (in some cases) even rejected by users.
2) Technological Limitations – Bluetooth’s low energy radio 
signals have always had reliability issues. Generally this is not a 
problem, mainly because Bluetooth is used for mundane tasks, like 
pairing a speaker, a set of wireless earbuds, or a smart watch to a 
mobile device. But when the same technology is used for contract 
tracing, which could be a matter of life and death, these reliability 
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issues can produce significant and crucial errors in the form of both false 
positives and false negatives. A false positive happens, when a healthy 
person is unduly treated as infected or exposed. This can happen for a 
number of reasons. But one way it can occur with Bluetooth is due to 
the fact that radio signals do not recognize physical barriers and can 
register contact through walls and other kinds of partitions. Conversely 
a false negative occurs when a person who might have been in close 
vicinity to an infected person does not register the contact because the 
Bluetooth handshake momentarily fails or encounters environmental 
disturbances that degrade the radio signal. 
3) Digital Divide - Digital technology is not evenly distributed. 
There still is a rather significant digital divide, and the individuals less 
likely to have and use the most up-to-date mobile devices and services 
are precisely those who are at risk during this pandemic. The best 
designed DCTT solution means little or nothing for those individuals 
and communities who do not have access to mobile devices and/or the 
data services necessary for their operation. This not only affects those 
on the “have-nots” side of the divide, but will have a wider social 
impact. If we rely too heavily on DCTT and do not do something 
proactive to account for individuals who cannot or choose not to use 
the technology, we risk exposures that cannot be tracked and managed 
by these technologically enabled solutions. As one possible solution 
to this problem, the John Hopkins University report recommends 
providing users with access to equipment and supporting data services: 
“States, localities, and institutions that recommend widespread use 
of DCTT should provide technology (e.g., mobile phones, Bluetooth 
devices) and free data packages to those who desire but lack access to 
these devices” (Kahn et al. 2020, 11).
If we follow the direction of McLuhan’s famous adage (e.g. “the 
medium is the message”), then we might summarize the message of 
DCTT in the following way: DCTT provides public health officials 
with some new tools to track and potentially control the spread of the 
COVID-19 infection. But these tools are not a silver bullet and will only 
be effective, when integrated with a more comprehensive public health 
plan that includes a diversity of approaches—some “old fashioned” or 
manual and some technological. DCTT may be a necessary piece of 
the puzzle, but it should not and cannot be considered sufficient in and 
by itself. 
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